I talked yesterday at Bornhack about the current state of secure messaging and the different primitives and threats that groups are working to address.
The talk is on youtube.
I’ll be talking at Linux Fest Northwest in a couple weeks.
Last week I talked briefly about the state of open internet measurement for network anomalies at IETF 98. This was my first time attending an IETF in-person meeting, and it was very useful in getting a better understanding of how to navigate the standards process, how it’s used by others, and what value can be gained from it.
A couple highlights that I took away from the event:
There’s a concern throughout the IETF about solving the privacy leaks in existing protocols for general web access. There are three major points in the protocol that need to be addressed and are under discussion as part of this: The first is coming up with a successor to DNS that provides confidentiality. This, I think, is going to be the most challenging point. The second is coming up with a SNI equivalent that doesn’t send the requested domain in plain-text. The third is adapting the current public certificate transparency process to provide confidentiality of the specific domains issued certificates, while maintaining the accountability provided by the system.
There are two proposals with traction for encrypting DNS that I’m aware of. Neither fully solve the problem, but both provide reasonable ways forward. The first is dnscrypt, a protocol with support from entities like yandex and cloudflare. It maintains a stateless UDP protocol, and encrypts requests and responses against server and client keys. There are working client proxies for most platforms, although installation on mobile is hacky, and a set of running providers. The other alternative, which was represented at IETF and seems to be preferred by the standards community is DNS over TLS. The benefit here that there’s no new protocol, meaning less code that needs to be audited to gain confidence of the security properties for the system. There are some working servers and client proxies available for this, but the community seems more fragmented, unfortunately.
The eventual problem that isn’t yet addressed is that you still need to trust some remote party with your dns query and neither protocol changes the underlying protocol where the work of dns resolution is performed by someone chosen by the local network. Current proxies allow the client to choose who this is instead, but that doesn’t remove the trust issue, and doesn’t work well with captive portals or scale to widespread deployment. It also doesn’t prevent that third party from tracking the chain of dns requests made by the client and getting a pretty good idea about what the client is doing.
SNI, or server name identification, is a process that occurs at the beginning of an HTTPS request where the client tells the server which domain it wants to talk to. This is a critical part of the protocol, because it allows a single IP address to host HTTPS servers for multiple domains. Unfortunately, it also allows the network to detect and potentially block requests at a domain, rather than IP granularity.
Proposals for encrypting the SNI have been around for a couple years. Unfortunately, they did not get included in TLS1.3, which means that it will be a while before the next iteration of the standard and the potential to include this update.
The good news was that there seems to be continued interest in figuring out ways to protect the SNI of client requests, though no current proposal I’m aware of.
Certificate Transparency is an addition to the HTTPS system to enforce additional accountability in to the certificate authority system. It requires authorities (CA)’s to publish a log of all certificates they issue publicly, so that third parties can audit their list and make sure they haven’t secretly mis-issued certificates. While a great feature for accountability and web security, it also opens an additional channel where the list of domains with SSL certificates can be enumerated. This includes internal or private domains that the owner would like to remain obscure.
As google and others have moved to require the CT log from all authorities through requirements on browser certificate validity, this issue is again at the fore. There’s been work on addressing this problem, including a cryptographic proposal and the IETF proposal for domain label redaction which seems to be advancing through the standards process.
There remains a ways to go to migrate to protocols which provide some protection against a malicious network, but there’s willingness and work to get there, which is at least a start.
In 2014, Domain Fronting became the newest obfuscation technique for covert, difficult to censor communication. Even today, the Meek Pluggable transport serves ~400GB of Tor traffic each day, at a cost of ~$3000/month.
The basic technique is to make an HTTPS connection to the CDN directly, and then once the encryption has begun, make the HTTP request to the actual backing site instead. Since many CDNs use the same “front-end cache” servers for incoming requests to all of the different sites they host, there is a disconnect between the software handling SSL, and the routing web server proxying requests to where they need to go.
Even as the technique became widely adopted in 2014-2015, its demise was already predicted, with practitioners in the censorship circumvention community focused on how long it could be made to last until the next mechanism was found. This prediction rested on two points:
We’ve seen both of these predictions mature.
Cloudflare, explicitly doesn’t support this mechanism of circumvention, and coincidentally has major Chinese partnerships and worked to deploy into China. Google also has limited the technique over periods as they have struggled with abuse (although mute in China, since the Google cloud doesn’t work there as a CDN.)
In terms of cost, the most notable incident is the “Great Cannon”, which targeted not only Github as widely reported, but also caused a significant amount of traffic to go to Amazon-hosted pages run by GreatFire, a dissident news organization, and costing them significant amounts of money. GreatFire had been providing a free browser that operated by proxying all traffic through domain-fronting. Due to a separate and less reported Chinese “DDOS” they ended up with a monthly bill for several tens of thousands of dollars and had to turn down the service.
The latest strike against domain fronting is seen in posts by Cobalt Strike and FireEye that the technique is also gaining adoption for Malware C&C. This abuse case will further incentivize CDNs from allowing the practice to continue, since there will now be many legitimate western voices actively calling on them to stop. Enterprises attempting to track threats on their networks, and CDN customers wanting to not be blamed for attacks will both begin putting more pressure on the CDNs to remove the ability for different domains to be intermixed, and we should expect to see a continued drop in the willingness of providers to offer such a service.
About five years ago two projects, Zmap and Masscan, helped to shift the way that many researchers thought about the Internet. The tools both provide a relatively optimized code path for sending packets and collecting replies, and allow a researcher with moderate resources to attempt connections to every computer on the IPv4 Internet in about an hour.
These techniques are widely applied to monitor the Internet-scale security of services, with prominent examples of censys.io, scans.io, and shodan.io. For the security community, they have become a first-step for reconnaissance, allowing hackers to find origin IPs masked by CDNs, unadvertised points of presence, and vulnerable hosts within an organization.
While the core of the Internet and the services we actively choose to connect with remain staunchly IPv4, the networks that many end hosts are connected to are more rapidly adopting IPv6, responding to the exhaustion and density of the IPv4 address space.
This fall, a new round of research has focused on what is possible for the enumeration and exploration of the IPv6 address space. ‘You can -J reject but you can’t hide’ was presented at CCC, focusing on spidering DNS records to learn of active IPv6 addresses which are registered within the DNS system. Earlier in the fall, there were several sessions at IMC thinking about IPv6. Most notably, “Entropy/IP – uncovering entropy in IPv6″, which looks at how addresses are allocated in practice as seen by Akamai at the core of the network. In addition, IPv6 was the focus of a couple WIP sessions, expressing thoughts on discovering hosts through progressive ICMP probing, as well the continued exploration of what’s actually happening in the core as seen by Akamai.
There will probably not be a shodan.io for ipv6 in the same way there is for ipv4. Instead, much of the wide-scale scanning on the IPv6 network will be performed through reflection from hosts discovered through their participation in other active services, for instance bit torrent, NTP, or DNS.
Conversely, the number of vulnerable IPv6 hosts will keep growing, because they can exist for much longer before anyone will find them. This will likewise increase the value that can be obtained through scanning – both to hackers, and to academics looking at Internet dynamics. We can expect to see a marketplace for addresses observed passively by ISPs, the network core, and passive services.
It’s worth also watching the watchers here: which providers are “selling me out” so to speak? It would be worth building the honey-pots to observe which services and servers leak client information and lead top probing and the potential for compromise of end hosts.
Third party analytics services are suffering from the growing prevalence of ad blocking, tracking protection, and the trend of minimizing connections and requests. However, from a site owner perspective, receiving usage information remains important for measuring site growth.
My expectation is that we are already on the curve where ads and tracking software will be more tightly integrated into websites and make it significantly more difficult for clients to disambiguate
“good” and “bad” scripts, which are mostly done today from the URL.
Google already provides the tools needed to relay analytics communication through a third party server, and it took under an hour to put together a proof of concept that removes the final third-party requests that are required when viewing this page. In essence, my server proxies all the requests that would normally go to Google, and adds on a couple extra parameters to track who the real client is.
The modified loading script for google analytics, and the corresponding nginx configuration to make my server a relay are here.
In the last week at Blackhat / Defcon two groups looked deeply at one of the lesser known implementations of network policy called Proxy Autoconfig. (In particular, badWPAD by Maxim and Crippling HTTPS with unholy PAC by Safebreach.)
These two talks both focus on what a malicious individual could do to attack the standard, and each find an interesting line of attack. The first attack is that the PAC file is allowed to make DNS requests in determining how to proxy connections, and in many browsers sees the full URL being accessed rather than only the domain. This means that even when the user is communicating with a remote server over HTTPS, the local network can learn the full URL that is being visited. The second attack has to do with where computers look for PAC files on their local network – for a file called `wpad.dat`.
While there is certainly the potential for an attacker to target a victim through these technologies, they are more accessible and arguably more valuable to a ISP or state level actor interested in passive surveillance. This explicit policy for connectivity is not inherently more invasive than policies employed by many ISPs already, and could likely be deployed on many networks without consumer push-back as a performance enhancement for better caching. It is also appropriate for targeted surveillance, since vulnerability can be determined passively.
The viability of surveillance through WPAD and PACs is a bit of a mixed bag. Most ISPs use DHCP already and set a “search domain”, which will result in a recognizable request for proxy information from vulnerable clients. While organizations often require all clients to enable discovery, this is not true of many consumer machines. Unfortunately, some versions of windows have proxy discovery enabled by default.
The NMAP tool used for network exploration, and pitched towards use as a tool facilitating network attackers, already has support for WPAD. In contrast, the network status and monitoring tools, like Netalyzr and OONI do not yet monitor local proxy status and won’t provide indication of malicious behavior.
I’m scheduled to give a talk at toorcamp next month about packet spoofing and SP^3.
I started running a public sp3 server today. It’s a small side-project I’ve hacked together over the last couple weeks to make it easier for people to play with packet spoofing. The server works similarly to a public proxy, but with the trade-off that while it won’t send high-volumes of traffic, it will allow you to send arbitrary IPv4 packets from any source you want.
There are a few fun applications that need this capability that I’ve been thinking of: helping with NAT holepunching of TCP connections; characterizing firewall routing policies; and for cover traffic in circumvention protocols. I think there are others as well, so I wanted to start running a server to see what people come up with.
The code is on github.